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The Eighty Percent and Twenty Percent Solutions to
Nuclear Proliferation
I. INTRODUCTION: NON-PROLIFERATION AT THE CROSSROADS
Nuclear non-proliferation issues abound in the news. Of note,
the U.S. Air Force has been reprimanded for lax nuclear security
measures,1 Iran is accused of trying to build a bomb,2 and experts
predict that the forty-year-old Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT)3 is failing.4 These nuclear proliferation fears
correspond to the issues of loose nukes, nations developing nuclear
arms, and inability of the international community to control nuclear
non-proliferation. Whether or not these fears become reality depends
on the effectiveness of the international nuclear non-proliferation
system.
Prognostications tend towards failure. In a worst-case scenario,
we could find ourselves living in a world with nuclear terrorists,
nuclear wars, and no international organizations able to control the
chaos.5 To avert the nuclear parade of horrors, most academics and
politicians agree that something must be done, but solving these
problems is difficult due to political differences inherent in the issues
of security, energy, and national interest. Some think that the current
mechanisms of non-proliferation are broken. They often advocate

1. Tom Vanden Brook, Nuclear Mishaps Lead to Air Force Resignations, USA TODAY,
June 6, 2008, at A4 (discussing the resignations of U.S. Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne
and U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Mosley following a report of “an overall
decline in nuclear weapons stewardship”).
2. Brian Ross & Christopher Isham, Exclusive: Iran Nuclear Bomb Could Be Possible by
2009, http://blogs.abcnews.com/theblotter/2007/04/exclusive_iran_.html (Apr. 2, 2007,
6:15 EST).
3. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1,
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT].
4. See, e.g., Jason D. Ellis, The Best Defense: Counterproliferation and U.S. National
Security, WASH. Q., Spring 2003, at 115, 119–20; Jack I. Garvey, A New Architecture for the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 12 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 339 (2008); William C.
Martel, The End of Non-proliferation?, STRATEGIC REV., Fall 2000, at 16.
5. See Quick Read Synopsis: Confronting the Specter of Nuclear Terrorism, ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Sept. 2006, at 167, 201–02 (summarizing a parade of horrors that
could come to pass if nuclear proliferation is not controlled).
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either for abandoning the system in favor of national action or for
strengthening the system. This discussion, however, focuses on the
NPT and neglects existent ad hoc approaches to non-proliferation.
These ad hoc mechanisms developed to fill the formal mechanisms’
gaps in capability, and they are part of the nuclear non-proliferation
solution.
This Comment argues that the formal mechanisms of nonproliferation are not broken, but that even when they are most
effective they do not prevent all forms of proliferation. While the
formal mechanisms may be strengthened, they will essentially remain
the eighty percent solution6 to nuclear non-proliferation, because the
irreconcilable political interests of major world nations and the
existence of rogue state and non-state actors necessitates an ad hoc
approach. Informal methods currently in use, multilateral and
bilateral negotiations and preemptive strikes, supply the remaining
twenty percent solution to nuclear non-proliferation. The
undesirable legal and political effects of ad hoc action do not justify
attempts to eliminate them.
This Comment proceeds in Part II by examining the nonproliferation problem, viewing the problem through historical and
political contexts. Part III examines the current mechanisms for
controlling proliferation and their legal doctrines. The oft pointed-to
mechanism of non-proliferation is the NPT, but it is only one
instrument in an array of instruments available to enforce the goal of
non-proliferation. The formal mechanisms are here characterized as
1) the enforcement provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty as embodied by the International Atomic Energy Agency; 2)
action taken by the U.N. Security Council; and 3) multilateral
organizations.7 In contrast, informal mechanisms include bilateral

6. This is a broad allusion to the Pareto 80/20 rule, an economics theory positing that
eighty percent of a problem is solved by twenty percent of the effort given to resolve it. In the
context of nuclear non-proliferation, this would mean that the twenty percent solution now
provided by ad hoc mechanisms solves the eighty percent majority of remaining nuclear nonproliferation problems. For more information on the Pareto 80/20 rule, see JOSEPH M.
JURAN, CRITICAL EVALUATIONS IN BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT 381–82 (John C. Wood &
Michael C. Wood eds., 2005) (explaining the theory and also that the theory is misnamed).
7. Export controls are an important part of the formal nuclear non-proliferation
regime, but as they are usually reflections of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
Security Council, multilateral agreements, and national policies, they are not analyzed
separately in this article. For a discussion on current export controls, see James E. Bartlett III
et al., Export Controls and Economic Sanctions, 42 INT’L LAW 301 (2008).
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and multilateral negotiations engaged in on an ad hoc basis by
interested parties and preemptive strikes (often unilateral). These
methods, collectively, address the non-proliferation problem, and
should be considered in a holistic discussion of nuclear nonproliferation.
Part IV examines the relationship between the formal and
informal mechanisms, evaluating the political constraints that would
limit a mandatory regime and examining the legality of ad hoc efforts
under international law. This part also justifies unilateral action to
prevent nuclear proliferation with the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention and posits that preemptive action is legal under
international law. Although the formal mechanisms are unable to
control some aspects of the proliferation problem, ad hoc
mechanisms adequately fill these system gaps. The international
community should recognize their value and not act to prevent them
when they are appropriate.
II. NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE WORLD STAGE: THE NONPROLIFERATION PROBLEM
On August 9, 1945, the United States military dropped a nuclear
bomb on Nagasaki, Japan. Since that day, no nuclear weapon has
been used in conflict, but nuclear weapons remain terrifying
instruments of war—perhaps the most terrifying. Although many
militaries around the world can put a conventional bomb on a
building and leave the neighboring buildings untouched via
precision targeting,8 nuclear weapons are city and civilization killers.
An all-out nuclear war would surely result in far more civilian than
military deaths. During the Cold War, political efforts and the threat
of mutually assured destruction prevented the use of nuclear
weapons.9 That same period birthed the movement to limit and
8. See, e.g., Air Force Link, Joint Direct Attack Munition GBU-31/32/38,
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=108 (last visited Sept. 14,
2009) (revealing the accuracy of the United States’ JDAM kit to within five meters). Nations
unable to produce their own precision-guided munitions are able to purchase them on the
open market. See Piotr Butowski, Ukraine Develops Indigenous Guided Airborne Weapons,
JANE’S AIR FORCES NEWS (Aug. 17, 2006), http://www.janes.com/defence/air_forces/
news/misc/ misc060817_1_n.shtml (announcing Ukraine’s entrance into the precisiontargeted munitions market and an intention to sell the weaponry).
9. Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., MAD and U.S. Strategy, in GETTING MAD: NUCLEAR
MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION, ITS ORIGINS AND PRACTICES 137, 137 (Henry D.
Sokolski ed., 2004) (presenting the theory of mutually assured destruction while asserting that
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eventually remove nuclear weapons from the world, which today is a
major policy method for providing security against a nuclear attack.
Through the NPT, nuclear powers agreed to limit their warhead
stockpiles (vertical proliferation) and nations without nuclear
weapons agreed not to seek them (horizontal proliferation).10 The
latter is currently the major concern because it is unlikely that
recognized nuclear powers would engage in nuclear war, and
therefore
this
Comment
primarily
addresses
horizontal
proliferation.11 To prevent horizontal proliferation, the NPT
structure assumes that when a nation possesses nuclear weapons,
neighboring states feel more pressure to develop their own arsenals
for protection. The treaty sought to induce the opposite effect,
where nations without nuclear weapons could rely on the treaty to
provide that their neighbors would not develop weapons and that
current nuclear powers would eventually disarm. The success of the
treaty, however, is hotly debated. To many policymakers and
bureaucrats it is “arguably the most successful arms control treaty in
human history,”12 whereas many academics see it as a failure.13
Those that argue the NPT is failing point to recent proliferation.
As the polar world of the Cold War fades further into history,
nations have increasingly used nuclear power and nuclear weapons to
play in the international power game. This technique is a doctrinal
snowball that gains more truthfulness as it is more broadly used.
India, for example, never signed the NPT, became a possessor of
nuclear weapons in 1974,14 and then completed a treaty normalizing
its civil nuclear status with the United States in 2008.15 Pakistan

it was not U.S. policy).
10. Richard L. Williamson, Jr., Law and the H-Bomb: Strengthening the Nonproliferation
Regime to Impede Advanced Proliferation, 28 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 71, 77 (1995) (discussing
horizontal, vertical, and advanced proliferation).
11. There are advocates for more reductions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles,
but worry that a rogue state would develop a nuclear weapon resonates as the greater danger.
12. JIM WALSH, LEARNING FROM PAST SUCCESS: THE NPT AND THE FUTURE OF NONPROLIFERATION 3 (2006), available at http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/no41.pdf.
13. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 4, at 119; Garvey, supra note 4, at 339; Martel, supra note
4, at 16.
14. India said that it had a “peaceful nuclear explosion experiment” on May 18, 1974.
George Perkovich, India Explodes A “Peaceful” Nuclear Device, in INDIA’S NUCLEAR BOMB:
THE IMPACT ON GLOBAL PROLIFERATION 161, 178 (1999).
15. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Indian Minister of External Affairs Pranab
Mukherjee, At the Signing of the U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (Oct.
10, 2008), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/10/110916.htm
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successfully tested a nuclear weapon in 1998,16 and currently faces no
sanctions from the U.N.17 North Korea signed the NPT, later
withdrew ratification,18 and in 2006 successfully detonated a nuclear
device.19 Adept at using the nuclear card, North Korea has since
traded a promise of disarmament for a removal of sanctions and
access to foreign capital20 and once again backed out of that deal
after realizing the benefits of the agreement.21 Advocates of the
NPT’s failure also point to problems in Iran22 and advertise various
solutions.23
The advent of sophisticated non-state actors expands
proliferation concerns. Failure proponents point out that the risk of
terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons increases proportionately with
the number of nuclear weapons states, which has grown. While
conventional terrorism theorists take the position that “[t]errorists
want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead,”24 with the
rise of al-Qaeda, the problems of “loose nukes” and continued

[hereinafter Signing of U.S.-India Nuclear Deal].
16. Nuclear Threat Initiative, Pakistan Profile, Nuclear Overview, http://www.nti.org/
e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Nuclear/index.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2009) (providing a
history of Pakistan’s nuclear program).
17. The closest Pakistan has come to sanctions was in 2001, but that issue involved
support of the Taliban and not nuclear weapons. Barbara Crossette, Russia Seeks Sanctions
Against Pakistan for Aid to Taliban, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2001, at A4.
18. North Korea’s Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a letter dated March 12, 1993, to the
President of the Security Council announcing North Korea’s intention to withdraw from the
NPT. S.C. Res. 825, U.N. Doc. S/RES/825 (May 11, 1993).
19. Nuclear Threat Initiative, North Korea Profile, Introduction, http://www.nti.org/
e_research/profiles/NK/index.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2009) (providing an overview of
North Korea’s nuclear program).
20. Glenn Kessler & Edward Cody, U.S. Flexibility Credited in Nuclear Deal with N.
Korea, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2007, at A11.
21. For some analysis on North Korea’s ever-changing status, see Editorial, The Latest
North Korea Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2008, at A28.
22. Editorial, Key Judgments From a National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's Nuclear
Activity, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2007, at A14 (offering a moderate to high assessment that Iran
does not have nuclear weapons, but that it had an active program as late as 2003 and that it
may still intend to develop weapons).
23. See, e.g., MARK STEYN, AMERICA ALONE: THE END OF THE WORLD AS WE KNOW
IT 149 (2006) (asserting that Iran is intent on obtaining nuclear weapons and that the use of
force will be required at some point); Kamran Riaz Akhtar, Does Pakistan Hold the Key?,
NATION, July 10, 2006 (arguing that the U.N. Security Council can act, but that it will need
Pakistan’s help to mediate).
24. Brian M. Jenkins, Testimony Before the Committee on Energy and Diminishing
Materials of the California State Assembly: Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? (Nov. 19, 1975).

745

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9/18/2009 4:48 PM

2009

proliferation, that wisdom may be out of date. According to several
intelligence agencies, Bin Laden’s organization is actively seeking
nuclear capability.25 The non-proliferation system will indeed be
irreversibly weakened if terrorists obtain the bomb.
Additionally, disarmament has stalled. The NPT was intended to
limit and eventually lay a framework for the elimination of nuclear
weapons,26 and this has not been the case. Of all the nations to
possess nuclear weapons, only South Africa has destroyed its
stockpile and national production ability.27 Other possessor nations
are actually updating nuclear capability, including the United States28
and Russia.29 This arms race is not one of more warheads, but of
better warheads, delivery systems, and missile defenses.30 Policies also
change; the U.S. Department of Defense’s 2005 Doctrine for Joint
Nuclear Operations—later cancelled—explained how nuclear
weapons could be used to “support both strategic and theater
nuclear plans” via various weapons systems, including cruise missiles,
and that they could be used in a “preemptive” attack.31 Judged in

25. See, e.g., Stefan Leader, Osama bin Laden and the Terrorist Search for WMD, 11
JANE’S INTELLIGENCE REV. 34, 34–37 (1999); KENNETH KATZMAN, TERRORISM: MIDDLE
EASTERN GROUPS AND STATE SPONSORS, 1999, available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/
govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-1003:1. Of course, any would-be nuclear terrorist would
have to do more than just obtain a weapon. To use it would require overcoming the difficulties
of undiscovered transportation of a large weapon and bypassing detonation safeguards.
26. The NPT required a good-faith effort at disarmament.
27. Bill Keller, South Africa Says It Built 6 Atom Bombs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1993, at
A1 (quoting former South African President F.W. de Klerk).
28. See, e.g., AMY F. WOOLF, U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS: CHANGES IN POLICY AND
FORCE STRUCTURE 9–10 (2005).
29. See, e.g., Russia: Countering U.S. Missile Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2008, at A16
(explaining that an upgrade will allow Russian missiles to evade the planned U.S. missile shield
based in Eastern Europe).
30. See Judy Dempsy, Accords on U.S. Missile Shield Are Taking Shape, Czech Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 17, 2008, at A7.
31. JOINT PUBLICATION 3-12: DOCTRINE FOR JOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, FINAL
COORDINATION (2), MAR. 15, 2005, at III-3, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/
wmd/library/policy/dod/jp3_12fc2.pdf. The Pentagon officially announced the cancellation
of the document on Feb. 2, 2006, after it was exposed by the Washington Post. Walter Pincus,
Pentagon Revises Nuclear Strike Plan: Strategy Includes Preemptive Use Against Banned
Weapons, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2005, at A1. Following the exposure, the Senate Armed
Services Committee asked for a briefing, and sixteen Democratic lawmakers protested. Press
Release, Congresswoman Ellen O. Tauscher, Rep. Tauscher Cautions Against Aggressive
Nuclear Policy (Dec. 2, 2005), available at http://www.nukestrat.com/us/jcs/JP_Congress
120205.pdf. The press release contains the text of the letter to President Bush. Although the
documents were cancelled, the policies may still be in effect.

746

DO NOT DELETE

741

9/18/2009 4:48 PM

Nuclear Proliferation

light of these arguments, it seems that NPT-related non-proliferation
mechanisms are indeed failing.
For the policy and bureaucratic communities that see the NPT as
a success, however, the arguments hinge on what the world would
be like without the NPT. In 1962, John F. Kennedy predicted that
proliferation was inevitable,32 which echoed the academic
community’s prognostication.33 In a recent examination of the NPT,
however, Professor Walsh points out that only seventy-five percent of
countries that could have become nuclear weapons states ever took
that step.34 Additionally, countries like Egypt and Australia
specifically gave up nuclear weapons programs when they joined the
NPT.35 The NPT has also shaped perceptions. In the 1960s, a
country seeking nuclear weapons was viewed as pursuing normal
military technology, but today these countries would be labeled as
“rogue states.”36 Lastly, there is some evidence that the NPT has
strengthened over time as more countries have joined and the
inspections process has been strengthened.37
While the NPT has accomplished much, there are still many
proliferation problems that it has failed to successfully conquer.
World leaders are worried. While the bold predictions on
proliferation from the 1960s have not come to pass, the U.S.
Government today warns that the NPT is collapsing,38 and U.S.
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates says that the long term prognosis

32. President Kennedy predicted that “by 1970, unless we are successful, there may be
10 nuclear powers instead of 4, and by 1975, 15 or 20.” PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES: JOHN F. KENNEDY 1963, at 280 (1964).
33. See, e.g., Sir John Cockcroft, The Perils of Nuclear Proliferation, in UNLESS PEACE
COMES 30, 37 (Nigel Calder ed., 1968); PIERRE GALLOIS, THE BALANCE OF TERROR:
STRATEGY FOR THE NUCLEAR AGE 229 (Richard Howard trans., 1961).
34. WALSH, supra note 12, at 12–13 (pointing out that Argentina, Australia, Belarus,
Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Libya,
Norway, Romania, South Korea, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine,
and Yugoslavia all could have developed nuclear weapons but did not). Whether or not all of
these countries’ decisions are attributable to the NPT regime is debatable. See infra Part III.B.
35. WALSH, supra note 12, at 14.
36. Id. at 16.
37. Id. at 17. The IAEA has been strengthened by the Model Additional Protocol that
has made IAEA safeguard agreements more meaningful. See infra Part III.A.1.
38. See John R. Bolton, The Bush Administration’s Forward Strategy for
Nonproliferation, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 395, 395 (2005) (arguing that “cumbersome treaty-based
bureaucracies” are no longer working to achieve non-proliferation). John Bolton was the
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security.
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is “bleak.”39 France committed to abolish nuclear weapons at the
2000 NPT review conference, but French President Sarkozy recently
defended France’s nuclear arsenal, stating, “All those who would
threaten our vital interests would expose themselves to severe
retaliation by France resulting in damages unacceptable to them, out
of proportion with their objectives. Their centres of political,
economic and military power would be targeted on a priority
basis.”40 This statement reflects France’s lack of confidence in the
NPT for protection. The containment of nuclear weapons for the
most part is a success story, but fears of proliferation still exist, and
nations are not completely willing to rely on the NPT.
III. THE MECHANISMS OF NON-PROLIFERATION
Faced with the destructive ability of nuclear weapons, leaders
throughout the world began to advocate for limiting nuclear arsenals
in the 1950s.41 The problem these world leaders recognized is that
mutual nuclear exchanges or attacks are a zero sum game that all
humanity loses. The non-proliferation movement had two major
aims. First, to combat the threat of mutually assured destruction, it
was imperative to limit the number of players in the game.
Proponents argued that fewer nations with nuclear weapons meant a
more stable political environment. Second, participants sought to
limit the number of nuclear weapons, both in simple quantity and
quality. This meant limiting the overall warheads in existence and
curtailing further development of more variants. Over time, political
will grew to a level that allowed for international action.
A. Formal Mechanisms of Non-Proliferation
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United
Nations Security Council, and various regional treaties are the
primary instruments of international power that have enforced non-

39. Robert Gates, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Speech at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace (Oct. 28, 2008), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/
1028_transcrip_gates_checked.pdf.
40. Rebecca Johnson, Is the NPT Being Overtaken by Events?, DISARMAMENT DIPL.,
Spring 2008, available at http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd87/87npt.htm.
41. E.g., INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, A SHORT HISTORY OF NONPROLIFERATION (1976) (explaining that several nations began advocating for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in the late 1950s).
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proliferation. By statute and charter, these bodies seek to create
peace among nations by removing the threat of nuclear war.
1. International Atomic Energy Agency
Created in 1957, the IAEA has a dual mandate to promote the
peaceful use of nuclear technology and to prevent its military use.42
It is an “autonomous” international non-governmental organization
closely affiliated with the United Nations.43 According to the two
organizations’ bilateral agreement, the Agency reports to the U.N.
General Assembly at each regularly scheduled session and to the
Security Council as appropriate.44
While the IAEA seeks to proliferate the peaceful uses of nuclear
technology, its role in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is
much more public. By its own assertions, the IAEA intends to be the
world’s nuclear watchdog—the primary body responsible for
controlling the proliferation of nuclear technology and weaponry.45
The Agency’s statute empowers it to “establish and administer
safeguards” to ensure that a nation’s nuclear program will not
“further any military purpose.”46
The IAEA accomplishes this mission by entering into bilateral
safeguard agreements with the various nations that have nuclear
programs. Agency inspectors enforce the safeguard agreements by
reviewing required national reports and physically inspecting nuclear
sites.47 In the event of non-compliance, the Agency’s statute limits
IAEA organic remedies to requesting corrective action from the
offending nation’s government, withholding additional nuclear
assistance—often technical expertise—and removing materials and

42. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Oct. 26, 1956, 276 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter IAEA Statute]. Eighty-one nations approved the IAEA statute on October 26,
1956 at the Conference on the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the
Agency opened its doors July 29, 1957. International Atomic Energy Agency, History of the
IAEA, http://www.iaea.org/About/history.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2009).
43. International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], The Texts of the Agency’s Agreements
with the United Nations, art.1, ¶ 2, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/11 (Oct. 30, 1959).
44. Id. at art. 3.
45. Mission
Statement
of
the
International
Atomic
Energy
Agency,
http://www.iaea.org/About/mission.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2009) (stating that the IAEA
is “the global focal point for nuclear cooperation” and is “independent”).
46. IAEA Statute art. III, ¶ A.5.
47. Id. at art. XII.
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equipment previously furnished by the Agency to the country.48
The IAEA may claim some success, in conjunction with the
NPT, in preventing proliferation. Twenty-four Agency member
states with peaceful nuclear programs—many that formerly sought
weapons—have not developed nuclear weapons and today are not
seeking them.49 Currently, analysts point to two problem states in
the world,50 North Korea and Iran, with only Iran being an IAEA
member.51 Other states that sought weapons in the past, like Egypt
and Australia, now do not.52 In spite of these successes, however,
there are weaknesses in the IAEA’s system.
Most commentators opine that the IAEA is not effective in
preventing non-proliferation. One obvious limitation is that for the
IAEA to act, the nation concerned must be a member state. As of
July 2009, one hundred fifty states are Agency members.53 Nonmember states of note are few: North Korea withdrew its
membership on June 13, 1994, and Cambodia withdrew on March
26, 2003.54 The Agency is also conflicted by the mandate to
proliferate civilian nuclear technology but to be the guardian of
nuclear weapons non-proliferation. Because civilian technology and
weapons technology are closely related, accomplishing the first
mission sometimes defeats the latter.
Another limitation is in the Agency’s inspection process, which
has been inadequate and has produced some high profile failures.
The original Agency statute required nations to declare their nuclear
sites to legitimize their programs with the IAEA and then allow
limited inspections to the declared sites. This requirement resulted in
an unintended loophole, whereby a nation could forgo declaring all

48. Id. at art. XII, ¶ A.7.
49. The countries with nuclear power that do not have nuclear weapons programs are
Argentina, Australia, Belarus, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy,
Japan, Kazakhstan, Libya, Norway, Romania, S. Korea, S. Africa, Sweden, Switzerland,
Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yugoslavia. WALSH, supra note 12, at 12–13.
50. Id. at 13.
51. List of IAEA Member States, http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/ MemberStates/
(last visited Sept. 14, 2009).
52. WALSH, supra note 12, at 13–15. Australia ratified the NPT in 1973, and Egypt
ratified the NPT in 1981. Id.
53. List of IAEA Member States, http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/MemberStates
(last visited Sept. 14, 2009).
54. Id.

750

DO NOT DELETE

741

9/18/2009 4:48 PM

Nuclear Proliferation

nuclear sites and escape inspection.55 To close the loophole, in 1997
the IAEA Board of Governors approved a Model Additional
Protocol that, when implemented, amends safeguard agreements to
require the IAEA to determine if undeclared facilities exist and
empower the inspectors to conduct “snap inspections.”56 These
developments strengthen the IAEA, but some nations have not
updated their safeguards agreements to incorporate the Additional
Protocol’s provisions.
Even with the implementation of the Additional Protocol,
inspections remain problematic. A recent report commissioned by
the U.S. Government cites the view that, “IAEA inspections are too
sketchy to ferret out nuclear misbehavior (e.g., North Korea, Iraq,
and Iran) and . . . in the rare cases when such violators are found out
(almost always by national intelligence agencies), the IAEA’s board
of governors is loath to act.”57 IAEA inspectors have had success,
such as being the only ones to correctly assess Iraq’s nuclear program
in 2002 and 2003,58 but the failure rate is too high to inspire a high
degree of confidence that the Agency can detect bad faith actors.
Events in the early 1990s sowed doubt regarding the IAEA
inspection process and its enforcement of safeguard agreements.
Three years after the fall of Romania’s communist dictator Nicolae
Ceauşescu in 1989, the country’s new government shocked the
world by announcing to the IAEA that it had discovered evidence of
a communist-era clandestine nuclear weapons program.59 Romania
had signed the NPT in 1970 and had publicly denounced nuclear
weapons. It had entered into a safeguard agreement with the IAEA
in 197260 and, in 1978, had contracted with a Canadian company for
55. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq exploited this loophole with particularity. See Charles D.
Ferguson, Nuclear Safeguards for a New Nuclear Age, BULL. OF THE ATOM. SCIENTISTS (web
ed. Dec. 18, 2007), available at http://www.thebulletin.org/node/77.
56. Id.; IAEA, Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the
International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, IAEA Doc.
INFCIRC/540 Corr. (Sept. 1997).
57. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY EDUCATION CENTER, FALLING BEHIND:
INTERNATIONAL SCRUTINY OF THE PEACEFUL ATOM 1 (2007), available at
http://www.npec-web.org/Frameset.asp?PageType=Single&PDFFile=20070731-NPECReportOnIaeaSafeguardsSystem&PDFFolder=Reports.
58. Id.
59. Ion Miahi Pacepa, Tyrants and the Bomb: There’s a Deep History to this Latest Kim
Jong Il Move, NAT’L REV., Oct. 17, 2006, available at http://article.nationalreview.com/
?q=YmU3NjM4ZTg3NjViMTUyNWJmYWYzMDE4ZmRhOTQxZmI=.
60. See the IAEA factsheet on Romania, available at http://ola.iaea.org/factSheets/
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a nuclear reactor to supply electricity.61 In December of that same
year Ceauşescu was dead, and in 1992 Romania’s new government
discovered separated plutonium, a bomb ingredient, at a TRIGA
research reactor in the town of Piteşti.62 Mihai Balanescu, the former
director of the Magurele Nuclear Research Institute, asserts that
Ceauşescu began a military program in 1978—the same year
Romania ordered the Canadian reactor—and that if the Romanian
Revolution of 1989 had not occurred, Ceauşescu would have had a
bomb in only a few more years.63 This failure demonstrated that a
country could have a secret weapons program in spite of the IAEA
safeguards.
A second failure in the early 1990s was the confirmation of Iraq’s
clandestine weapons program, started in 1971, in the aftermath of
the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In the years that followed, information
on the Iraqi program added shame to the IAEA system, for the
Iraqis had purposefully manipulated the Agency in building their
weapons program. According to Khidhir Hamza, a lead scientist that
worked on the program, “the IAEA proved extremely useful.”64
Because of the Agency’s dual mandate, Iraq was able to utilize
“civilian” nuclear technologies and IAEA training to almost develop
the bomb.
The program’s first step was to develop weapons grade
plutonium. In 1973 Iraq approached the IAEA and requested help
to build a nuclear power plant.65 Iraq then acquired a “research
reactor, a fuel-manufacturing plant, and nuclear fuel-reprocessing
facilities” through the IAEA in order to develop nuclear power

CountryDetails.asp?country=RO, which signals the signing of the Application of safeguards in
connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Romania-IAEA on
Mar. 8, 1972.
61. DUANE BRATT, THE POLITICS OF CANDU EXPORTS 17 (2006) (noting that
Romania ordered a CANDU reactor from AECL in 1978, but that it was not completed until
1996).
62. Pacepa, supra note 59, at 1. It is interesting to note that the reactor was given to
Romania by the U.S. in the 1970s. Wendy Mbekelu, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation:
Romania, THE ONLINE NEWS HOUR (May 2, 2005), available at http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/indepth_coverage/military/proliferation/countries/romania.html.
63. Baietul’ lui Ceausescu, Mort in Fasa, Evenimentul Zilei, Dec. 10, 2002, available at
http://www.evz.ro/articole/detalii-articol/513785/Baietelul-lui-Ceausescu-mort-in-fasa/.
64. Khidhir Hamza, Inside Saddam’s Secret Nuclear Program, 54 BULL. OF THE ATOM.
SCIENTISTS, Sept.–Oct. 1998, at 26, 30. Hamza served in various posts in the program,
including the position of director of weaponization. Id. at 26.
65. Id. at 28.
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plants, but with the “hidden agenda” to develop weapons grade
plutonium.66 In Iraq, scientists began weapons research, while in
Vienna at the IAEA’s headquarters, Iraq successfully obtained a seat
on the board and learned how IAEA inspections worked, with the
ultimate goal of learning how to thwart them.67 After several years
the Agency, convinced of Iraq’s peaceful intentions, allowed Iraq to
import highly enriched uranium fuel and the components for
plutonium production, and provided the needed training to use the
technology.68 The IAEA never became aware of Saddam Hussein’s
weapons program through their interactions with Iraq.
When IAEA inspectors came, the Iraqi research teams followed
strict guidelines that prevented discovery of the weapons work. A few
years after starting their nuclear program, Iraq successfully placed a
spy in the Middle East seat of the Agency’s Board of Governors who
reported to the government the details of the inspection processes.69
Based on a thorough understanding of the inspection rules and the
pressures on individual inspectors, the Iraqis masked their
development program well. Locked doors prevented inspectors from
entering certain rooms, and berms prevented inspectors from seeing
new buildings.70
Only after the Persian Gulf War, when the IAEA received aerial
photos of nuclear sites in Iraq, did the inspectors realize that they
had been duped.71 As a result of this failure, nations around the
world lost confidence in the IAEA. As stated by Egypt’s permanent
representative to the U.N., “[a]fter what happened in Iraq, no one is
one hundred percent sure and has full confidence in the verification
system and safeguards as applied by the IAEA.”72
The IAEA’s weaknesses in preventing proliferation stem from a
lack of covert intelligence, a conflicted dual mandate, and little real
power to punish perpetrators. “Watchdog” is an appropriate term—
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 30–31.
KHIDHIR HAMZA & JEFF STEIN, SADDAM’S BOMBMAKER: THE TERRIFYING INSIDE
STORY OF THE IRAQI NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AGENDA 74–77 (2000).
70. Hamza, supra note 64, at 32.
71. Id.
72. Nabil Elaraby, Permanent Rep. of Egypt to the U.N., The Security Council and
Nuclear Weapons, Address Before the NGO Working Group on the Security Council (May 28,
1996), in GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, available at http://globalpolicy.igc.org/security/
docs/elaraby.htm.
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the Agency watches and can do little more. It is not an attack dog. If
the IAEA were the only non-proliferation entity, there would indeed
be cause to worry. As the “failures” amply demonstrate, however,
the Agency does not act alone, and in both the case of Romania and
of Iraq, neither country developed an atomic bomb. When the
Agency does discover a violation that would require some executive
action, it appeals to the U.N. Security Council.
2. U.N. Security Council
The U.N. Charter announces that the first purpose of the United
Nations is to “maintain international peace and security.”73 The
U.N. Security Council accomplishes this mandate by authorizing
economic and political sanctions and by authorizing the use of
force.74 The Security Council has five permanent members—China,
France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States—and ten
members elected from the General Assembly.75 The chief limitations
on the Council’s powers are political and structural: permanent
members may veto any substantive action.76
This limitation has typically prevented the Security Council from
acting decisively in the area of nuclear non-proliferation. In 1996, a
Security Council member lamented the lack of solid action on the
part of the Council to address the issues of non-proliferation.77 By
Resolution 255 of 1968, the Council sought to assure states
forgoing nuclear weapons that they would be protected by signing
the NPT,78 but this said nothing that the U.N. Charter did not
already say. In 1995, the Security Council adopted Resolution 984,
which “did not include effective deterrence against the threat or use
of nuclear weapons, [or] provide any general protection against an
attack or a threat.”79 The indictment at the time was that “the
Security Council has always been very reluctant to get involved in
disarmament matters and in nuclear weapons.”80

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
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U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1.
Id. at arts. 39, 41–42.
Id. at art. 23.
Id. at art. 27.
See Elaraby, supra note 72.
S.C. Res. 255, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/255 (June 19, 1968).
Elaraby, supra note 72.
Id.
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Since 1996, the Security Council increasingly has passed
resolutions dealing with the issue of nuclear non-proliferation. Many
of these invoke targeted sanctions against North Korea and Iran.
North Korea’s nuclear weapon test in 2006, for example, brought
the Security Council into action via Resolution 1718, which imposed
nuclear- and arms-focused economic sanctions in addition to travel
restrictions on nuclear program personnel.81 Prior to that resolution,
the Council had asked North Korea to reconsider its 1993
withdrawal from the NPT,82 and to suspend ballistic missile
development.83 The only effect of these resolutions, however, seems
to be in demonstrating to North Korea that China is not the ally that
it once was. China abstained from the 1993 Resolution,84 but voted
for the more recent 2004 and 2006 Resolutions.85 This reflects a
change in Chinese policy from a proponent of proliferation to a
proponent of non-proliferation and de-nuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula.86 The Resolutions did not prevent North Korea from
gaining nuclear weapons, or the missiles to deliver warheads to states
within the region.87 Upon the passage of Resolution 825 and the
implementation of targeted sanctions, however, North Korea did
return to the negotiating table at the “six-party talks.”88 In this sense
the Security Council did play a role in this latest round of North
Korean non-proliferation efforts, but on the whole the Council has
not greatly affected a resolution of the situation.
When the IAEA began having problems with Iran, in July 2006

81. S.C. Res. 1718, ¶¶ 8, 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1718 (Oct. 14, 2006).
82. S.C. Res. 825, supra note 18, at ¶ 1.
83. S.C. Res. 1695, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1695 (July 15, 2006).
84. U.N. Security Council Resolution 825 on the North Korean Nuclear Issue, 4 U.S.
DEPT. OF STATE DISPATCH, Issue 21, at 383 (May 24, 1993).
85. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Condemns Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea’s Missile Launches, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1695 (2006), U.N.
Doc. SC/8778 (July 15, 2006); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Condemns
Nuclear Test by Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Unanimously Adopting Resolution
1718 (2006), U.N. Doc. SC/8853 (Oct. 14, 2006).
86. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Condemns Nuclear Test by
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1718 (2006),
U.N. Doc. SC/8853 (Oct. 14, 2006).
87. North Korea’s Missile Programme, BBC NEWS, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/asia-pacific/2564241.stm (last visited Sept. 14, 2009).
88. Ed Henry, Elise Labott & Susie Xu, North Korea Links Talks to Money, CNN.COM,
Nov. 1, 2006, available at http://www.brudirect.com/DailyInfo/News/Archive/Nov06/
021106/wn01.htm.
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the Security Council approved Resolution 1696 by a 14-1 vote,89
calling upon Iran to comply fully with IAEA directives and
inspections processes, suspend uranium enrichment by August 31,
2006, and begin negotiating a long-term nuclear safeguard
agreement.90 Iran did not comply with the Resolution, and so the
Security Council again took up the matter that December. Via
Resolution 1737, adopted unanimously,91 the Council imposed
sanctions on Iran, cutting it off from access to foreign markets for
technology that could be used in the Iranian nuclear program.92 The
IAEA reported Iran’s noncompliance the following February, and so
the Council passed Resolution 1747, calling upon states to restrict
the travel of Iranians engaged in nuclear work and expanding
sanctions to cover all arms and related material as well as any kind of
financial aid not for humanitarian or developmental purposes.93 With
the IAEA reporting another round of noncompliance,94 the Council
further tightened sanctions in March 2008, freezing certain financial
assets and calling upon states to inspect Iranian cargo shipments.95
The Security Council’s ability to prevent the proliferation of
nuclear weapons is limited by political will and structural processes.
Without organic intelligence capability, the Council is most often in
a reactive mode, and because it is a deliberative body, deciding on a
course of action often takes time. When a nuclear proliferation
situation arises, the Security Council may pass a Resolution, but
historically sanctions have not deterred leaders determined to obtain
nuclear weapons. Thus, while many nations have decided to forgo
nuclear weapons, covert weapons programs have not been effectively

89. Quatar was the lone dissenter, citing instability in the Middle East as justification.
Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Demands Iran Suspend Uranium Enrichment
by 31 August, or Face Possible Economic, Diplomatic Sanctions, U.N. Doc. SC/8792 (July
31, 2006).
90. S.C. Res. 1696, ¶¶ 1–4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006).
91. Quatar changed its vote. Speaking for his country, Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser
affirmed that Quatar believes that Iran’s nuclear intentions are peaceful, but cannot condone
Iran’s failure to comply with the NPT. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council
Imposes Sanctions on Iran for Failure to Halt Uranium Enrichment, Unanimously Adopting
Resolution 1737 (2006), U.N. Doc. SC/8928 (Dec. 23, 2006).
92. S.C. Res. 1737, ¶¶ 3–12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23, 2006).
93. S.C. Res. 1747, ¶¶ 2, 6–7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007).
94. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Tightens Restrictions on Iran’s
Proliferation-Sensitive Nuclear Activities, Increases Vigilance over Iranian Banks, Has States
Inspect Cargo, U.N. Doc. SC/9268 (Mar. 3, 2008).
95. S.C. Res. 1803, ¶¶ 10–11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008).
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addressed by the Security Council, as in the cases of Korea and Iraq.
The Resolutions take slow, incremental steps, instead of decisive
action, and have not yet involved authorizing the use of force when
justified solely from the standpoint of nuclear non-proliferation.96
Political will and the structure of the Security Council create this
effect, because to pass a Resolution over a permanent member’s veto,
the Resolutions end up at the lowest common denominator. In
other words, if a permanent member is unwilling to vote for a
Resolution, then the other members can hold the vote as a matter of
public record or they can alter the Resolution to find a form that will
satisfy all the permanent members: the lowest common denominator.
One alternative to this kind of political problem is to create regional
pacts not subject to U.N. structural limitations.
3. Regional regimes: the Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
There are currently five regional areas of the world declared free
from nuclear weapons, as well as the seabed and outer space.
Through the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Latin American and Caribbean
nations agreed to forgo nuclear weapons in 1968.97 Most of the
nations of the South Pacific agreed to prohibit the presence of
nuclear weapons and nuclear testing through the Treaty of
Raratonga, entered into force in 1986.98 African nations agreed at
the first session of the Organization of African Unity that it would be
a good idea to have a continent free from nuclear weapons.99
Negotiations endured for some time, however, and although the

96. When the Security Council decided to take no action to prevent the “Coalition of
the Willing” from using military force in Iraq, the goal of preventing Saddam Hussein from
acquiring weapons of mass destruction—thought to be chemical and biological, but not
nuclear—was one reason among many. See Press Release, Briefing Security Council, U.S.
Secretary of State Powell Presents Evidence of Iraq’s Failure to Disarm; Several Council
Members Call for More Time for Inspections; France Proposes Strengthening of Inspection
Regime, U.N. Doc. SC/7658 (Feb. 5, 2003); Press Release, Security Council Hears Over 60
Speakers in Two-Day Debate on Iraq’s Disarmament; Many Say Use of Force Should Be Last
Resort, Others Urge Swift Action, U.N. Doc. SC/7666 (Feb. 19, 2003); Press Release, U.S.
Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the U.N. Security Council, (Feb. 5, 2003), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html (offering a
transcript of Secretary Powell’s remarks to the Security Council).
97. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America [Treaty of
Tlatelolco], Feb. 14, 1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 326.
98. South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty [Treaty of Raratonga], Aug. 6, 1985, 24
I.L.M. 1442.
99. G.A. Res. 47/76, U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (Dec. 15, 1992).
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Treaty of Pelindaba opened for signature in 1996, it has not yet
come into force.100 The Treaty of Bangkok created a nuclear weapon
free zone in South East Asia in 1996.101 The Antarctic treaty
prohibits nuclear testing and disposal of radioactive waste in
Antarctica.102 Other treaties ban nuclear weapons from the seabed103
and space.104 To provide more security, the treaties commonly
feature protocols signed by NPT-recognized nuclear weapons
powers, whereby the nuclear states agree to respect the nuclear free
zones.105
Most of these regional treaties were signed or first gained
impetus in the late 1960s, and the trend for the creation of new
treaties has since slowed. There have been discussions about the
creation of new zones in Central Asia, the Middle East, South Asia,
North East Asia, and Central Europe,106 but active efforts to draft
treaties for these areas are not underway. In 1992, North and South
Korea signed a bilateral declaration to ban nuclear weapons from the
Korean peninsula,107 but although it entered into force that year,
North Korea has not honored it. Excepting the Korean peninsula,
the areas of the world with regional treaties are free from nuclear
weapons.

100. African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty [hereinafter Treaty of Pelindaba], Apr.
11, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 698. The zone consists of Africa and islands surrounding the continent in
the Atlantic and Indian oceans.
101. Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone [Treaty of Bangkok],
Dec. 15, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 635.
102. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
103. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof
[Seabed Treaty], Feb. 11, 1971, 955 U.N.T.S. 115.
104. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies [Outer Space Treaty], Jan. 27,
1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
105. See, e.g., U.S. Department of State, Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
in Latin America and the Caribbean [Treaty of Tlatelolco], (article on file with author)
(discussing the treaty protocols signed by nuclear weapons powers).
106. See Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones, available at
http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/library/treaties/nuclear-free-zones/trty_nuclear-freezone-index.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2009).
107. Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, N. Korea-S.
Korea, Jan. 20, 1992, available at http://www.ppnn.soton.ac.uk/nb17.pdf, at 16. The
declaration entered into force one month after it was signed on February 19, 1992. See
Nuclear Threat Initiative, Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations &
Regimes, http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/koreanuc.pdf, at 1 (last visited Sept. 14, 2009).
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Whether or not the treaties are the cause or result of these
nuclear free zones is debatable. Within the treaty areas, only South
Africa was required to disarm to become a signatory. South Africa,
then not a signatory to the NPT, built several nuclear weapons in the
1980s.108 Soviet and U.S. intelligence communities monitored South
Africa’s nuclear program and suspected that the country had nuclear
weapons.109 African leaders argued that their continent should be
free from nuclear weapons, but no formal agreements were initially
signed. After the fall of apartheid, South Africa destroyed its weapons
and disclosed its program to the world.110 The Treaty of Pelindaba
was signed shortly thereafter.111 It may be argued that either the
nations of Africa were unwilling to sign the treaty until they were
sure that no nuclear weapons existed on the continent, or that they
were galvanized to sign the treaty to prevent nuclear weapons from
again appearing on the continent. Perhaps both may be true. But no
treaty has yet been successful in a region of the world where a nation
had nuclear weapons and then gave them up as a result of the treaty.
Regional treaties are effective to the extent that they deny nations
within their boundaries an incentive to obtain nuclear weapons.
The formal framework of nuclear non-proliferation established
by the IAEA, the U.N., the NPT, and other treaties is loose, often
slow to react, and inadequate to prevent proliferation in many
instances. Regional treaties are effective at preventing further
proliferation but are not yet practicable solutions in areas of the
world that already have nuclear weapons. While these mechanisms
have largely prevented the predicted proliferation of nuclear
weapons, they remain as a partial, eighty percent solution to the
problem of nuclear non-proliferation.
B. Informal Methods
The remaining twenty-percent of the non-proliferation problem
does not remain completely unsolved. When formal mechanisms fail,
informal mechanisms emerge to fill the gaps. Because the IAEA

108. HELEN E. PURKETT & STEPHEN F. BURGESS, SOUTH AFRICA’S WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION (2005).
109. Michael R. Gordon, Washington Welcomes de Klerk Disclosure, but Wants More
Details, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1993, at A12.
110. Id.
111. Treaty of Pelindaba, supra note 100.
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inspections are slow and not always adequate, national intelligence
organizations continue to monitor nuclear programs around the
world. Because the IAEA and the Security Council are unable to
decisively address nuclear non-proliferation due to lack of authority
and lack of political will, groups of nations and individual nations
have taken a role in more informal and ad hoc efforts to prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons.
1. Bilateral and multilateral negotiations
Not every nuclear state is an IAEA member or a signatory to the
NPT. Although states fall outside these mechanisms, other states
often engage them with negotiations and bilateral treaties under
which they may become responsible for their nuclear behavior. Some
of these negotiations and treaties include India’s bilateral
negotiations with the U.S., a global partnership to combat
proliferation, and talks with North Korea.112
a. India and bilateral negotiations. When India became a nuclear
power in 1975, the nation was in a middle ground because it refused
to choose sides in the Cold War and had not signed the NPT. It has
remained in the middle ground to a certain extent, still refusing to
sign the NPT but becoming an IAEA member.113 In 1997, India
voted against a provision in a U.N. General Assembly resolution
calling for all non-signatories to the NPT to accede to the treaty.114
Instead of treating India in the same manner as North Korea,
however, many nations of the world are beginning to accept India as

112. This list is by no means exhaustive. Other examples of bilateral negotiations include
Libya’s twenty-year “negotiation” over nuclear and chemical weapons with the United States,
see, e.g., Steven R. Weisman, U.S. Lifts Trade Embargo on Libya in Return for Promise on Arms,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2004, at A7, and French involvement in nuclear programs with Algeria
(suspected of having a nuclear weapons program) and the United Arab Emirates (not
suspected of having a nuclear weapons program), see, e.g., Elaine Sciolino, A New France in the
New Middle East: Forget Glory, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2008, at 3.
113. Pakistan and Israel are the other nations in the middle ground with India. They have
not signed the NPT but possess nuclear weapons. See FAS.org, Signatories and Parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, available at http://www.fas.org/
nuke/control/npt/text/npt3.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2009).
114. U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., 67th plen. mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc. A/52/PV.67 (Dec. 9,
1997). Israel and Pakistan were the only nations that joined India in voting against the
provision, which was part of General Assembly Resolution 52-38. G.A. Res. 52/38, § K, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/52/38, at 14–16 (Dec. 9, 1997). India and several other nations, including
Iran, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan then abstained from voting on the Resolution. U.N.
GAOR, 52d Sess., 67th plen. mtg. at 16, U.N. Doc. A/52/PV.67 (Dec. 9, 1997).
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part of the nuclear weapons club—even though the NPT limits the
nuclear weapons club to the five permanent members of the Security
Council.115 So, while India continues to refuse to sign the NPT,
which would require it to destroy its military nuclear capability,
efforts to formalize India’s place in the non-proliferation context,
outside the formal NPT rules, are underway.
Beginning in 2005, the United States stepped outside the NPT
and engaged India bilaterally as a strategic partner in nonproliferation. Taking up President Bush’s call to move beyond old
non-proliferation frameworks that prevent the U.S. from addressing
today’s threats116 and reacting to his 2005 joint statement with
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh,117 in 2006 the U.S.
Congress passed legislation allowing for a civil nuclear partnership
deal.118 In July 2007, President Bush and Prime Minister Singh
developed a “123 Agreement” that created a civil nuclear
partnership.119 The deal reverses the U.S. ban on shipping nuclearrelated technology to India, a ban that was in place due to India’s
position outside the NPT and IAEA regimes. India’s parliament
approved the deal in a tight vote in July 2008.120
To enforce the deal internationally, India needed to establish a
new safeguards agreement with the IAEA that would expand IAEA
inspections and incorporate the language of the Additional Protocol
to allow for IAEA snap inspections. India formally submitted the

115. NPT, supra note 3, at art. IX, ¶ 3.
116. George. W. Bush, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President to Students and
Faculty at National Defense University (May 1, 2001), available at http://merln.ndu.edu/
archivepdf/russia/WH/20010501-10.pdf. As he outlined how bi-lateral action would not
violate current non-proliferation treaties, President Bush told the students: “Today’s world
requires a new policy, a broad strategy of active nonproliferation, counterproliferation and
defenses. We must work together with other like-minded nations to deny weapons of terror
from those seeking to acquire them. We must work with allies and friends who wish to join
with us to defend against the harm they can inflict. And together we must deter anyone who
would contemplate their use.” Id.
117. Press Release, U.S. Department of State, Joint Statement Between President George
W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (July 18, 2005), available at
http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/india/WH/20050718-6.pdf (announcing the intention of
President Bush to normalize U.S. nuclear relations with India).
118. 22 U.S.C. §§ 8001–8008 (2006); 42 U.S.C § 2153(d) (2000).
119. Office of the Spokesman, Fact Sheet: U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative
– Bilateral Agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation, July 27, 2007, available at
http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/india/State/89552.pdf.
120. Rama Lakshmi & Emily Wax, India’s Government Wins Parliament Confidence Vote,
WASH. POST., July 23, 2008, at A12.
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new safeguards agreement to the IAEA in July 2008, and the Board
of Governors controversially approved the agreement on August 1,
2008.121 The U.S. then guided a waiver through the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, which controls the civilian trade of nuclear
materials around the world, and obtained a waiver for India on
September 6, 2008.122 With the international hurdles cleared, the
U.S. Congress gave final approval to the deal on October 1, 2008,123
and President Bush signed the United States-India Nuclear
Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act a
week later on October 8, 2008.124 Two days later, Indian External
Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice signed the 123 Agreement.125
The deal generated political waves and interest around the world.
With the U.S. having laid the groundwork, France and India signed
a bilateral civilian nuclear policy deal126 and the U.K. lifted a ban on

121. Press Release, IAEA Press Report, IAEA Board Approves India-Safeguards
Agreement: Agreement Would Widen IAEA Access to Civil Nuclear Facilities (Aug. 1, 2008),
available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2008/board010808.html (noting that
the agreement would expand IAEA inspections from the current number to six reactors to
fourteen by 2014).
122. Kim Barker, U.S. Pact Transforms India’s Role in Nuclear Club: Proposed Deal with
the U.S. Paves Way for the Transformation, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 29, 2008, available at
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/chi-india-nukes_barkersep29,0,6813807.story;
Thaindian
News,
NSG
Passes
India
Waiver
by
Consensus,
available
at
http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/uncategorized/nsg-passes-india-waiver-by-consensus
-lead_10092949.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2009).
123. On September 27, 2008, H.R. 7081 and its implementing legislation were passed in
the House by a vote of 298-117-1. The Senate passed S. 3548, the text of which is identical to
H.R. 7081, on October 1, 2008. See Library of Congress, Bills, Resolutions, H.R. 7081,
available
at
http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:HR07081:@@@L&
summ2=m& (last visited Feb. 11, 2009); Library of Congress, Bills, Resolutions, S. 3548,
available
at
http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:SN03548:@@@L
&summ2=m&; see also United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and
Nonproliferation Enhancement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–369 (2008), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_public_laws
&docid=f:publ369.110.pdf.
124. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush Signs H.R.
7081, the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation
Enhancement Act (Oct. 8, 2008), available at http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/india/
WH/20081008-4.pdf.
125. Signing of U.S.-India Nuclear Deal, supra note 15, at 1. Secretary Rice hailed the
agreement between the world’s largest democracy and the world’s oldest democracy as a first
step in continued nuclear and strategic partnership. Id.
126. India, France Ink Nuclear Deal, ECON. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2008, available at
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/PoliticsNation/India_France_ink_nuclear_deal/article
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exporting civilian nuclear technology to India.127 Pakistan’s Prime
Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani stated that his country wants a deal with
the U.S. similar to India’s.128 Israel could also follow. Other
countries may also put civilian nuclear deals into place outside the
NPT.129
Critics are appalled at this new development in non-proliferation,
which they argue will gut the NPT. They point to the lack of IAEA
oversight of India’s nuclear weapons program and argue that India
will now be able to obtain the latest in nuclear technology and
transfer that expertise to their weapons program.130 Additionally, the
precedent being set—that a country can partly legitimize prior
“illegitimate” acquisition of nuclear weapons through bilateral
actions with states already in the nuclear club—flies in the face of the
NPT. This is politically sensitive, because while the U.S., France, and
the U.K. are comfortable with India as an ally, China is not. The
same is true of other nations that could try to follow India’s lead,
such as Israel. These are legitimate concerns.
Proponents counter that these concerns are too idealistic, and
that the realistic view is that India already has sophisticated nuclear
weapons and the means to deliver those weapons, so the arbitrary
NPT cut-off date of January 1, 1967, should not be overly
influential.131 Proponents therefore argue that the U.S. approach
under President Bush is an improvement on the old NPT method
because it seeks to bring India into the official nuclear club as a
regulated and law-abiding citizen of the world. The IAEA and
Nuclear Suppliers Group supported the deal based on this reasoning,

show/3546835.cms. France actually signed its deal with India before the U.S. Id.
127. Britain Lifts India Nuclear Ban, BBC NEWS, Nov. 10, 2008, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7720397.stm.
128. Pakistan Demands US Nuclear Deal, BBC NEWS, Oct. 2, 2008, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7648435.stm. India, Pakistan’s chief rival, has
stated that it does not object to a Pakistan-U.S. nuclear deal. India Not Against US–Pakistan
N-Deal:
Pranab,
TIMES
OF
INDIA,
Oct.
11,
2008,
available
at
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/3583688.cms. But with the A.Q. Khan stain
on Pakistan’s proliferation record, a deal may not be likely for a while. See Kate Heinzelman,
Towards Common Interests and Responsibilities: The U.S.–India Civil Nuclear Deal and the
International Nonproliferation Regime, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 447, 469–70 (2008).
129. See Heinzelman, supra note 128, at 468–69.
130. Esther Pan & Jayshree Bajoria, The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL., Oct. 2, 2008, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/9663/
(summarizing the criticisms of William C. Potter and other nuclear non-proliferation experts).
131. NPT, supra note 3, art. IX, ¶ 3.

763

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9/18/2009 4:48 PM

2009

and given this precedent, Israel and Pakistan will seek to follow
India’s path. This effort on their part would require them to make
positive developments from the non-proliferation standpoint, such as
Pakistan tightening its security measures to prevent another A.Q.
Khan debacle132 and Israel normalizing its nuclear weapon status
with its neighbors and the formal members of the NPT nuclear club.
b. The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and
Materials of Mass Destruction. Following the collapse of the Soviet
Union, warnings abounded that a terrorist or other third party could
obtain a nuclear weapon from a former Soviet Republic. This
concern, known as the problem of “loose nukes,”133 has received
attention in the press and from politicians.
In response, the leaders of the G8 nations—Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States, as well as a European Union representative—formed a
partnership in June 2002 to support specific cooperation projects,
initially in Russia, to address non-proliferation, disarmament,
counter-terrorism, and nuclear safety issues.134 The members fund
the projects.135 During its first two years, the partnership worked in
Russia to dismantle decommissioned nuclear submarines, to secure
and dispose of fissile materials, and to find new employment for
scientists formerly employed in the Soviet nuclear industry.136
The dismantling of submarines continues at a slow pace,137 but

132. Abdul Qadeer Khan is a popular Pakistani scientist who in January 2004 admitted
to having passed sensitive nuclear-weapons technology to Libya, Iran, and North Korea.
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf later pardoned him. William J. Broad, David E. Sanger,
& Raymond Bonner, A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation: How Pakistani Built His Network, N. Y.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2004, at A1. Khan now asserts that he was made into a scapegoat for a larger
Pakistani proliferation ring. World News With Charles Gibson: Pakistani Bomb Scientist Breaks
Silence (ABC television broadcast May 30, 2008), available at http://abcnews.go.com/
Blotter/Story?id=4964884&page=1.
133. See, e.g., Graham T. Allison, Russia’s “Loose Nukes”: The Continuing Threat to
American Security, HARV. MAG., Sept.–Oct. 2000, at 34 (examining the problem of loose
nukes and suggesting solutions).
134. Kananaskis Summit, Statement by G8 Leaders: The G8 Global Partnership against
the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2002/state_g8.html.
135. See id.
136. Department of State, Bureau of Nonproliferation, Fact Sheet: The G-8 Global
Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, Aug. 24, 2004,
available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/34967.htm.
137. For analysis and a progress report, see Christina Hansell Chuen, Russian NuclearPowered Submarine Dismantlement and Related Activities: A Critique, JAMES MARTIN
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the rest of the program as it relates to nuclear nonproliferation has
stalled. The group’s intentions have met up with fiscal problems.138
With the current downturn in the global economy, even the richest
nations in the world are less concerned about nuclear nonproliferation. This is a political choice; for the partnership to succeed
to the point that it fulfills all its goals, the G8 leaders will need to
reinvigorate it.
c. North Korea six-party talks. North Korea has caused problems
for the international community from the time of the Korean War,
but dealing with North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has bested
many world leaders of the last decade. When North Korea withdrew
from the NPT in 2003, China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South
Korea, and the United States agreed to participate in a six-party
negotiation. The talks began in August 2003, but they produced no
real results during their first four years, as apparent results were set
back by adverse actions, such as North Korea’s various missile tests
and nuclear weapons test in 2006.139
Following the nuclear weapon test, however, several changes
took place that allowed for progress among the negotiating parties.
The Security Council, as mentioned, imposed arms importation
restrictions, nuclear focused economic sanctions, and travel
restrictions on nuclear program personnel.140 More importantly,
however, the U.S. shifted some major negotiation positions and
became amenable to (1) allowing North Korea to retain civilian
nuclear technology within the parameters of the NPT and IAEA
inspections; (2) agreeing to discuss making the 1953 cease fire
agreement into a permanent peace treaty; and (3) releasing North
Korean funds frozen at a bank in Macau.141 The negotiators were
then able to make more progress, and in February 2007, North
Korea agreed to shut down its reactors in exchange for fuel, food,
and progress on normalizing its relations with Japan and the U.S.142
CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUD., May 24, 2007, available at http://cns.miis.edu/
stories/070524.htm (arguing that there is not a well-defined plan for dealing with the solid
radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel in the submarines).
138. Id.
139. David E. Sanger & Jim Yeardly, U.S. Warns North Koreans About Nuclear-Weapon
Test, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2006, at A3.
140. S.C. Res. 1718, supra note 81, at ¶¶ 8, 12.
141. Helene Cooper, North Korea Talks: Back to the Table, Some Reluctantly, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 2006, at A8.
142. Edward Cody, N. Korea Demands May Delay Reactor Shutdown, WASH. POST, Mar.
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North Korea continues to present difficult problems, however,
because the government uses nuclear technology as a chip in a larger
game of international relations. The nation’s compliance has again
stalled, most recently over an inspections issue. As a result, on
October 12, 2008, the Bush Administration removed North Korea
from the U.S.’s terror watch list. North Korea then resumed
demolition of its primary nuclear weapons complex and allowed
monitors access to the site.143 The pattern of negotiation involves
North Korea trading compliance with non-proliferation standards for
strategic objectives, and then breaking some of its agreements so that
it can begin the cycle again. The difficulties of the North Korean
problem illustrate that sometimes patience is a necessary virtue in
non-proliferation efforts—perhaps an ironic fact given the danger of
nuclear proliferation: once a nation willing to use a nuclear bomb
acquires one, non-proliferation is useless. Preventing this problem
may require the use of force.
2. Unilateral and preemptive strikes
In dealing with non-proliferation, some nations have shown a
willingness to act unilaterally and preemptively. The doctrine of
preemption is ancient, and has been used throughout history as
justification for war.144 Recently it has been popularized in a variant
known as the “Bush Doctrine,” which refers to the policy of
President George W. Bush to act with force, unilaterally and
preemptively, to secure the interests of the United States.145

14, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/
03/14/AR2007031401030.html.
143. Choe Sang-Hun & Helene Cooper, North Korea to Resume Disabling Nuclear
Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2008, at A6.
144. See, e.g., ELLERY CORY STOWELL & HENRY FRASER MUNRO, INTERNATIONAL
CASES: ARBITRATIONS AND INCIDENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AS
PRACTISED BY INDEPENDENT STATES VOLUME II: WAR AND NEUTRALITY 556 (1916)
(discussing the doctrine of preemptive attacks); Hew Stratchan, Preemption and Prevention in
Historical Perspective, in PREEMPTION: MILITARY ACTION AND MORAL JUSTIFICATION 23–39
(Henry Shue & David Rodin eds., 2007) (outlining how preemptive strikes have played a role
in military history from the beginning of the western world until modern history).
145. President Bush announced his foreign policy doctrine at the West Point
Commencement address on June 1, 2002. For a transcript of President Bush’s address, see
Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush Delivers
Graduation Speech at West Point, June 1, 2002, available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/
official_docs/pres/bush_wp_prestrike.pdf. There is no real broad agreement on what the
“Bush Doctrine” is, but as a minimum standard it certainly must include preemptive acts of

766

DO NOT DELETE

741

9/18/2009 4:48 PM

Nuclear Proliferation

According to the 2006 National Security Strategy of the United
States,
It is an enduring American principle that [protecting Americans
and American interests] obligates the government to anticipate and
counter threats, using all elements of national power, before the
threats can do grave damage. The greater the threat, the greater is
the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking
anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains
as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. There are few
greater threats than a terrorist attack with WMD.
To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the
United States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising our
inherent right of self-defense.146

This statement speaks of “anticipatory action,” acting
“preemptively” and the greater risk of inaction as compared to
action. In the language of contract law, it is anticipatory breach:
acting before another party has the opportunity to cause real harm.
Despite the criticisms of the Bush Doctrine,147 with all its associated
policy implications, preemptive attack remains a valid—though
controversial—international legal doctrine.148

force, which is the basic definition here used. Others have used the term to also include the
idea of Democratic regime change. See Discussion by Ben Wattenberg, Max Boot, Adam
Garfinkle, & Samantha Power, Think Tank with Ben Wattenberg (PBS television broadcast July
11, 2002), available at http://www.pbs.org/thinktank/transcript1000.html. See also ROBERT
G. KAUFMAN, IN DEFENSE OF THE BUSH DOCTRINE (2007) (arguing that swift, preemptive
actions are desirable traits for foreign policy in the Middle East). Even the “Bush Doctrine”
version of preemption is not new. Alberto Gentili, an Italian that served as a professor at
Oxford, wrote in 1588 that “no one ought to wait to expose himself to danger. No one ought
to wait to be struck unless he is a fool. . . . Force must be repelled and kept aloof by force.”
ALBERTO GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI (1588), cited in Stratchan, supra note 144, at 24.
146. THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 18
(2006).
147. For a more developed discussion of the Bush Doctrine, see, e.g., ALAN M.
DERSHOWITZ, PREEMPTION: A KNIFE THAT CUTS BOTH WAYS 153–57 (2007).
148. Id. at 61–69, 195–224. Professor Dershowitz’s thoughtful and thorough discussion
of preemption does not assert any grand conclusion, largely because none can yet be stated in
all circumstances. The doctrine is very fact specific and has many facets in modern practice. As
stated by Professor Dershowitz:
So long as nations are threatened by other nations or terrorist groups, preemptive or
preventive military action will remain an option and will on occasion be employed.
When international organizations are incapable of, or refuse to, intervene in
situations where intervention is deemed necessary, nations will act unilaterally or
with selected allies. That is the reality, and no jurisprudence will ever change that
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The idea of preemptive attacks springs from ancient ideas of selfdefense, or something like a version of the modern saying that “the
best defense is a good offense.” Leaving aside ancient historical
examples, preemptive action by a nation’s military is not new in this
century or the last. World War I began largely as a result of a series
of “preemptive” attacks.149 Japanese leadership viewed its attack on
Pearl Harbor as preemptive,150 and Israel launched a “preemptive”
strike against Arab nations in the Six Day War of 1967.151 Most
recently the U.S. and its allies cited preemption as justifying the
2003 Iraq war.152
While many nations will engage in preemptive attacks, Israel is
the best example of a nation willing to follow the policy to prevent
an enemy from acquiring nuclear weapons.153 The first and betterknown incident was the bombing of an Iraqi reactor in 1981, but
Israel also attacked a Syrian site in 2007.
Iraq publicly began a civilian nuclear program in the 1970s.
While the IAEA and the U.N. were convinced that Iraq’s nuclear
program was peaceful, Israel was not.154 France began construction
of a nuclear reactor for Iraq in 1979, and Israeli intelligence reports
expressed concerns that Iraq would produce plutonium at the
reactor.155 In 1981, while diplomats argued over the situation,

because a nation’s survival is not, and never will be, purely a matter of law.
Id. at 195.
149. JOHN H. MAURER, THE OUTBREAK OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR: STRATEGIC
PLANNING, CRISIS DECISION MAKING, AND DETERRENCE FAILURE 101 (1995) (pointing out
that a German preemptive strike precipitating a feared British preemptive strike opened
hostilities between the two powers).
150. ALAN ARMSTRONG, PREEMPTIVE STRIKE: THE SECRET PLAN THAT WOULD HAVE
PREVENTED THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR 175–76, 190–91 (2006) (discussing a
preemptive American plan to bomb Japan that was in turn preempted by Japan’s strike on
Pearl Harbor).
151. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 147, at 80–82.
152. ROBERT J. PAULY & TOM LANSFORD, STRATEGIC PREEMPTION: U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY AND THE SECOND IRAQ WAR 53–55 (2005) (explaining how the Bush
Administration’s National Security Strategy justified preemption and how the doctrine of
preemption justified U.S. policy leading to the 2003 Iraq war).
153. The 2003 invasion of Iraq by the “Coalition of the Willing” comes close, but in this
case the weapons of mass destruction alleged to be in Iraq were chemical and biological.
154. Israel was not the only nation worried about Iraq’s nuclear reactor. Iran launched an
unsuccessful air strike against the Al-Tuwaitha site nine months prior to Israel’s. HAMZA &
STEIN, supra note 69, at 128.
155. Jed C. Snyder, The Road to Osiraq: Baghdad’s Quest for the Bomb, MIDDLE EAST J.,
Autumn 1983, at 567–68.
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Israel’s government decided that it had to bomb the Osirak reactor
at Al-Tuwaitha before it became operational, in order to keep Iraq
from obtaining plutonium that could be used to build a nuclear
weapon.156
Operation Opera was conceived, and on June 7, 1981, Israeli F16 and F-15 jets flew through Saudi Arabian airspace to Iraq, where
they executed a successful bomb run.157 International reaction
overwhelmingly condemned Israel’s attack, but even after the
bombing, Israel remained wary of Iraq’s activities, especially
concerning undeclared buildings at the Al-Tuwaitha site.158
Following the Gulf War in 1991, IAEA inspections revealed that
Israel had been right. Even after the Osirak bombing, Iraq continued
its research and likely would have had a crude nuclear weapon
sometime in 1993.159
As can be seen by Israel’s raid on a possible Syrian nuclear site in
2007,160 Israel continues to believe that the formal mechanisms of
nuclear non-proliferation are not adequate protection. While neither
side will confirm details, sometime after midnight on September 6,
2007, Israel launched the operation.161 It had previously inserted a
team of commandos into Syria near the site of a suspected nuclear
facility.162 Israeli aircraft then bombed the target, a building
suspected of housing a nuclear reactor being built with the help of
North Korea.163 Pre- and post-strike satellite photos made available
to the press indicated that multiple buildings had been destroyed.164

156. Id. at 577–78.
157. Eight Israeli F-16s dropped fourteen two-thousand-pound bombs on the complex,
destroying it. DAN MCKINNON, BULLSEYE ONE REACTOR 172, 178–79 (1987).
158. Hamza, supra note 64, at 28 (explaining that the buildings were later confirmed to
be used in research for weapons-grade plutonium).
159. David A. Kay, Denial and Deception Practices of WMD Proliferators: Iraq and
Beyond, WASH. Q., Winter 1995, at 85. David Kay was a chief IAEA inspector in Iraq
following the Gulf War.
160. Mark Hosenball, A New Intelligence Failure?, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 5, 2007, at 10
(discussing Israel’s raid against a suspected nuclear reactor site in Syria on September 6, 2007).
161. Seymour M. Hersh, A Strike in the Dark: What Did Israel Bomb in Syria?, NEW
YORKER, Feb. 11, 2008, at 58, available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/
2008/02/11/080211fa_fact_hersh.
162. Sarah Baxter, Uzi Mahnaimi & Michael Sheridan, Israelis ‘Blew Apart Syrian
Nuclear Cache’: Secret Raid on Korean Shipment, TIMES (London), Sept. 16, 2007, available at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article2461421.ece.
163. Hersh, supra note 161.
164. Id. at 59–60.
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While the details are not entirely known, it is clear that Israel once
again engaged in the ultimate ad hoc mechanism of nuclear nonproliferation: a unilateral, preemptive strike.
Reaction from the world’s non-proliferation players was
predictable. Shortly after Israel bombed the site, Syria complained to
the U.N., but the Security Council did nothing.165 The IAEA
condemned the action,166 and the U.S. would not comment.167
Then, several months later, the IAEA confirmed traces of synthetic
uranium at the site168—an almost sure sign of nuclear activity.
Among the ad hoc methods of nuclear non-proliferation,
unilateral preemptive strikes are the most controversial. Israel’s ad
hoc air strikes raise questions about what level of ad hoc mechanisms
should be tolerated in the world community, but they also show that
sometimes a unilateral and preemptive strike will be tolerated and
may even be part of an “emerging jurisprudence” of “proportional,
reasonable, and lawful preventative action.”169 Ad hoc actions, while
not formally part of the nuclear non-proliferation system, are and
must continue to be part of the nuclear proliferation solution. While
the formal mechanisms of non-proliferation provide the majority of
the solution, “rogue state” actors may slip through system gaps if ad
hoc methods are not utilized. These methods may therefore be an
important deterrent. Israel, for example, has given indications that it
would attack Iran to prevent that nation from acquiring nuclear
weapons,170 though Iran apparently does not give much weight to
Israel’s unilateral threat.171 Other nations might also take unilateral
preemptive action if threatened with nuclear weapons development

165. Syria Complains to U.N. over Israel, BBC NEWS, Sept. 12, 2007, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6989961.stm.
166. Yossi Melman, IAEA Slams Israel for Bombing Alleged Nuclear Reactor in Syria,
HAARETZ, Apr. 26, 2008, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/
978043.html.
167. Hersh, supra note 161, at 59–60.
168. Hala Gorani, U.N.: Uranium Traces Found in Syria, CNN.COM, Nov. 17, 2008,
available at http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/11/17/syria.uranium/index.
html.
169. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 147, at 220.
170. In June 2008, Israel sought U.S. support for a preemptive airstrike designed to
cripple Iran’s nuclear capability. See, e.g., Michael R. Gordon & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Says Exercise
by Israel Seemed Directed at Iran, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2008, at A1.
171. See, e.g., David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, Allies’ Clocks Tick Differently on Iran,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2009, at 1 (discussing the divergent reactions of Israel and the U.S. to
Iran’s still-progressing nuclear program).
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by neighbors.172 Limiting the use of force to the Security Council is a
noble goal but could also be political and real suicide for a nation
such as Israel. The option of unilateral preemptive strikes remains
viable.
V. CHOOSING A MANDATORY REGIME OR ALLOWING AD HOC
METHODS
Despite international efforts, some nations—both NPT
signatories and non-signatories—have sought nuclear weapons. It
would be too idealistic to assume that if clandestine programs existed
in the past that none exist today.173 In dealing with the proliferation
threats of today and of the future, ad hoc proliferation solutions will
continue to be used to the extent that the formal regime does not
address all the problems. This default system of ad hoc action should
be allowed to continue to fill the gaps, because formal mechanisms,
even if they could create a mandatory regime, would never
sufficiently address every nation’s security concerns.
A. The Spectrum of Non-Proliferation Mechanisms
The non-proliferation toolbox available to deal with the
problems of horizontal proliferation is larger than the formal
methods of the NPT, IAEA inspections, Security Council action, and
multilateral treaties. Ad hoc methods have developed and are part of
the international system. The greater the threat, the more likely that
a nation will act more unilaterally and more preemptively to prevent
proliferation.
The mechanisms of non-proliferation discussed in this Comment
can be organized by placing them on a continuum with two axes.
On the left end of the scale, or x-axis, would be action that is

172. Consider, for example, what Russia might do if one of the Caucus nations were to
seek nuclear weapons, or how China might react to a nuclear weapons program in Taiwan,
Vietnam, or another neighboring nation.
173. Current suspects for secret nuclear programs include Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.
See, e.g., Albert Aji, Syria Denies US Claim of a Secret Nuclear Program, USA TODAY, Apr. 25,
2008 (reporting that the U.S. asserts and Syria denies the existence of a secret nuclear program
in Syria); Douglas Jehl, Group Says Iran Has Secret Nuclear Arms Program, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
17, 2004 (reporting that Iran has a secret nuclear weapons program); Saudi Arabia Working
on Secret Nuclear Program with Pakistan Help – Report, FORBES, Mar. 28, 2006, available at
http://www.forbes.com/finance/feeds/afx/2006/03/28/afx2629000.html (suggesting that
Pakistani nuclear scientists have been working with Saudi Arabia).
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multilateral, and on the right end, action that is unilateral. At the
bottom of the y-axis would be action that is diplomatic, whereas the
top of the y-axis scale would be the use of force. The more
multilateral an effort, the more likely that methods up to and
including the use of force would be lawful through formal
mechanisms. The more unilateral an action, the less likely it is that
actions such as bi-lateral negotiations would be viewed as within the
formal mechanisms. A dividing line may then be drawn that separates
formal and ad hoc mechanisms. This dynamic is shown in figure one.
Figure 1. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Schematic

Use of
Force

Ad Hoc
Mechanisms

Sanctions

Negotiation

Formal
Mechanisms

Talks
Multilateral
Actions

Unilateral
Actions

The bold line indicates approximate limits of the current formal
regime, or the area of the eighty percent solution to the problems of
nuclear proliferation. The dashed line indicates an area of approval,
or acceptance, of some ad hoc mechanisms, notably negotiation, as
with India. Some aspects of the non-proliferation problem lie outside
both lines, such as a nation secretly seeking nuclear weapons, as in
the cases of Iraq, Romania, and North Korea. While this schematic
could be charted and measured, such actions would be beyond the
scope of this Comment.
B. A Mandatory Regime?
The framework for non-proliferation established by international
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law is capable of transforming into a stronger, more mandatory
regime that would more effectively prevent the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. But this development is not probable, and even if it
happened, a mandatory system could never supplant all the deterrent
abilities of ad hoc mechanisms. A mandatory system could come
about in two broad methods. First, the Security Council could pass a
standing resolution instilling a formal, strong approach to nuclear
non-proliferation,174 which would increase deterrence incentives.
This would be something of a top-down approach, which would
require the permanent members of the Security Council to act
collectively. A second source for change is the NPT. Future treaty
rounds could create additional protocols that would strengthen
inspections and require disarmament. This would be a bottom-up
approach, requiring the broad support of many nations to create a
momentum that would eventually persuade the current nuclear
weapon states to act. However, neither approach is likely, due to
politics.175
1. A new Security Council standing resolution
As the only body universally recognized as able to authorize the
use of force, the U.N. Security Council could act under Chapter VII
to implement a new standing resolution that would apply a system of
increasingly powerful targeted sanctions against violators. In general,
targeted sanctions are designed to hit a nation’s leaders where it will
hurt them, and therefore cause them to change their leadership
decisions. As such, these sanctions are targeted at individuals,
typically by imposing a combination of travel restrictions, financial
restrictions, and criminal responsibility.176 To date, they work in a

174. Professor Jack Garvey first suggested this approach. Jack Garvey, A New
Architecture for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 12 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L.
339, 346–50 (2007).
175. The international legal system is always prone to political limitations, and even the
nations of Europe—the foremost champions for a strong, and even mandatory, international
legal system—disregard international law when it is in their interest to do so. Jack Goldsmith
& Eric Posner, Does Europe Believe in International Law? Based on the Record, It Has No
Grounds to Criticize the U.S., WALL STREET J., Nov. 25, 2008, at A15. See also JACK
GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006).
176. Michael Bothe, Security Council’s Targeted Sanctions Against Presumed Terrorists:
The Need to Comply with Human Rights Standards, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 541, 544 (2008).
Bothe notes that targeted sanctions in the form of travel restrictions have been used against
leaders in Sierra Lione, Liberia, and Afghanistan (the Taliban). Id. at 560 n.13.
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two-step process. As the first step, the Security Council identifies
prohibited conduct and authorizes the targeted sanctions. As the
second step, individual nations then act to enforce the sanctions by
implementing visa restrictions, freezing bank accounts, or issuing
warrants.
Politically, targeted sanctions are viewed well.177 They are seen as
a progressive step in the right direction, because rather than
punishing a nation as a collective, they seek to punish and therefore
alter the behavior of specific leaders.178 There are some concerns that
the system does not afford the “target” the ability to confront
accusers,179 and therefore some have called for such a forum to be
created. This could be a good development for nuclear nonproliferation, as a hearing or tribunal might strengthen the effect of
targeted sanctions by providing a forum in which suspect world
leaders would justify their acts. In the specific area of nonproliferation, targeted sanctions have already proven effective at
“countering the spread of nuclear weapons technology.”180
Resolution 1540 set up a regime of targeted sanctions against the
proliferation of “nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as
their means of delivery.”181 This Resolution is a step towards a
stronger international response.
As a next step, the Security Council could declare that nuclear

177. This is not to say that the system does not have critics. As pointed out by Bothe,
both academics and NGOs worry that the system lacks accountability. For a more detailed
reading, Bothe points the reader to D. Frank, U.N.-Sanktionen gegen Terrorismus und
Europaische Menschenrechtskonvention, in HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF
LAW 237 (S. Breitenmoser et al. eds., 2007); C. Warbrick, The European Response to Terrorism
in an Age of Human Rights, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 989–1018 (2004).
178. Bothe provides a good summary of the argument for targeted sanctions:
Traditional non-military enforcement measures pursuant to Article 41 of the Charter
are value deprivations imposed upon states as collectivities. The measures expressly
mentioned are the interruption of economic relations, i.e. embargoes, and of other
communications (of which the interruption of air traffic has had a major significance
in recent times). This type of measure has rightly been criticized as both ineffective
and unjust. It is unjust because it mainly hits the innocent population. It is
ineffective because it does not or only rarely reaches those who are personally
responsible for a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace. In the light of this
experience, a system of ‘targeted’ sanctions has been developed which is directed
specifically against these persons.
Bothe, supra note 176, at 543.
179. See id. at 543–44.
180. Garvey, supra note 174, at 346.
181. S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
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weapons proliferation is a “threat to the peace.”182 This would put
the leadership of any nation of non-state actor on notice that
Chapter VII consequences are imminent for acts of proliferation.
The Council could then establish technical benchmarks for uranium
enrichment and the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel—two of the
main indications of a nuclear weapons program183—and authorize
the implementation of the system of targeted sanctions for their
violation.184 This system would be stronger than the current system
because it would authorize greater deterrence measures and would
not be subject to a vote once implemented. Unfortunately, it would
also be a stepped system, and it could still be difficult to authorize
the use of force.
It remains unlikely, however, that the Security Council could
implement this solution. Furthermore, even if it was implemented,
the solution would not completely address nuclear nonproliferation.185 The ability of a nation with a permanent veto to
forestall this development, compounded with the fact that more than
one permanent member of the council would disfavor such a regime,
makes this solution, for the near future, unlikely.186 If such a system
were adopted, this process would retain some of the weaknesses of
IAEA inspections mentioned earlier that led to the IAEA’s inability
to ferret out clandestine nuclear weapons programs.187 Thus the
added deterrence could still not reliably deal with covert actors.
2. New treaty rounds
For the community of interested nations that might feel
individually impotent in the non-proliferation regime, change
through the NPT remains very difficult to achieve. The NPT directs
that a review conference take place every five years.188 The
conferences are not typically successful forums for generating great

182. U.N. Charter, art. 39.
183. Garvey, supra note 174, at 346.
184. Id.
185. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 147, at 195.
186. Not only would the U.S. probably not favor this solution, but based on their
histories, China and Russia would also balk at making the system more mandatory. Even the
U.K. and France, proponents of a strong international legal system, might balk when it came
time to vote. See Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 175.
187. See supra Part III.A.1.
188. NPT, supra note 3, at art. VIII, ¶ 3.
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movement. The most recent conference, in May 2005, was “the
biggest failure in the history of [the NPT].”189 The blame was laid
squarely at the feet of the U.S., which was accused of marginalizing
the NPT in favor of the Bush Doctrine.190 Policies change from
conference to conference, but at present there seems little possibility
for great change through the NPT, because the participating
members have no political unity.
C. Reconciling the Ad Hoc System with International Law
As previously discussed, the “statutes” of international law
establish a nuclear non-proliferation system that is functional, but
not perfect.191 Various actors have created a system of ad hoc tactics
and maneuvers to perfect the faulty system.192 For the spectrum of ad
hoc actions, from negotiations to unilateral preemptive strikes, the
more an act tends to the use of force and unilateralism, the more it
conflicts with traditional theories.
1. Extra-NPT negotiations
Negotiations independent of the NPT regime seem to be
allowable under international law, although some argue that they
weaken the NPT. The U.S. negotiation with India, for example, was
by some accounts a betrayal of the NPT that would foster the
Treaty’s demise.193 This argument may overstate the point, but it is
true that negotiations outside the NPT make the NPT optional in
that India has succeeded in gaining some official status as a nuclear
power without complying with the NPT. The panic caused by this
happening should be tempered with the reality that India is a stable
democracy with a history of peace, and that it took over forty years
to develop its program.194 This negotiation also opened a door for

189. HARALD MÜLLER, THE 2005 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE: REASONS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE AND OPTIONS FOR REPAIR 1 (2005), available at
http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No31.pdf.
190. Id. at 2–6.
191. See supra Part III.A.
192. See supra Part III.B.
193. See Peter van Ham & Olivia Bosch, Global Non-Proliferation and CounterTerrorism: The Role of Resolution 1540 and Its Implications, in GLOBAL NON-PROLIFERATION
AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: THE IMPACT OF UNSCR 1540 at 16 (Peter van Ham & Olivia
Bosch eds., 2007).
194. See supra Part III.B.2.a.

776

DO NOT DELETE

741

9/18/2009 4:48 PM

Nuclear Proliferation

other nations to normalize their relationships with India, and
possibly for Pakistan and Israel to sign international agreements
governing their nuclear status.
2. Unilateral actions
Theories justifying the unilateral use of force have changed in the
last few decades; notably the doctrine of humanitarian intervention
would seem to justify unilateral ad hoc action outside the formal
sanction of the Security Council.195 The doctrine of humanitarian
intervention is born from the moral imperative that we, as people,
should not let other people die.196 The rules of humanitarian
intervention derive from events of the last few decades.197 While the
rules are ambiguous,198 the doctrine roughly holds that when there is
international recognition of an impending humanitarian disaster
likely to be accompanied with violations of international law,
intervention by a coalition or single nation is appropriate if the
Security Council takes no action, as long as it complies with the law
of war.199
NATO’s actions in Kosovo in 1999 illustrate that the use of
force justified by the doctrine of humanitarian intervention does not

195. This doctrine is summarized in its most forward form in THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE
SOVEREIGNTY (2001), available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf. The
report argues for fundamental changes in the international law of state sovereignty, positing
that in a better legal system, states would have an affirmative duty to intervene in states that fail
to guarantee their own citizens’ human rights. Id. at 11–12.
196. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 28.
197. Intervention often takes place with an explicit U.N. mandate, such as the actions of
the Australian-led INTERFET in East Timor in 1990, but this is not a requirement, as can be
seen with France’s intervention in Cote d’Ivoire where the U.N. later approved the action.
Other examples are ECOMOG’s intervention in Liberia in 1990, Operations Provide Comfort
and Provide Comfort II in Iraq in 1991, ECOMOG’s deployment to Sierra Leone in 1997 to
stop the RUF rebellion, the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, the ECOMOG action in
Guinea-Bissau in 1999, and ECOMOG’s deployment to Liberia again in 2003. The two
patterns that emerge, intervention without explicit U.N. approval and intervention with
subsequent explicit U.N. approval, both point to the acceptance of Humanitarian Intervention
as customary international law.
198. Daphne Richmond, Normativity in International Law: The Case of Unilateral
Humanitarian Intervention, 6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 45, 46 (2003).
199. See generally Julie Mertus, Reconsidering the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention:
Lessons from Kosovo, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1743 (2000) (arguing that humanitarian
intervention is justified under the U.N. Charter).
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require explicit U.N. approval.200 In 1999, the international
community feared that Serbia was ethnically cleansing Albanians
from Kosovo.201 The United Nations failed to react, due to Russia
and China’s exercise of their veto power in the Security Council.202
As a result, NATO, acting under its own charter, initiated a military
campaign that succeeded in driving the Serbian military from
Kosovo, establishing peace in the region and allowing the refugees to
return.203
Russia and China introduced a resolution in the Security Council
condemning NATO’s actions as a breach of international law on the
ground that it was a use of force that lacked Security Council
approval. Only Russia, China, and Namibia voted in favor, with
Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Britain, Canada, France, Gabon, Gambia,
Malaysia, the Netherlands, Slovenia, and the U.S. voting against.204
Additionally, the U.N. Human Rights Committee voted to condemn
Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo by forty-four to one (Russia
being the lone dissenter). Kofi Annan, then the Secretary General of
the United Nations, stated as the campaign began that “there are
times when the use of force may be legitimate in the pursuit of
peace.”205 Mr. Annan still would have preferred that NATO act
through the U.N.,206 but his comment demonstrates his
understanding of the political realities limiting the Security Council.
Whether or not the pursuit of nuclear weapons fits the definition
of a humanitarian crisis obscures the applicability of the doctrine in
regards to unilateral strikes against nuclear proliferation targets. To
the extent that an act is unilateral, the doctrine requires that the
crisis be increasingly large and immediate. Unilateral attacks against
200. Id. (justifying NATO’s actions in Kosovo under the doctrine of Humanitarian
Intervention).
201. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Will We Fail Kosovo’s Refugees?, Mar. 30, 1999,
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/1999/03/30/will-we-fail-kosovos-refugees
(citing
the
masses of ethnic Albanian refugees fleeing Kosovo as Serbian troops cracked down).
202. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Rejects Demand for Cessation
of Use of Force Against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. SC/6659 (Mar. 26, 1999)
[hereinafter Security Council Rejects Russian Demand].
203. None Dare Call It Victory, N.Y. POST, June 10, 1999, at 34 (explaining that NATO
forced Milosevic to sign an agreement allowing for a resolution of the Kosovo crisis).
204. Security Council Rejects Russian Demand, supra note 202, at 1.
205. Martin Kettle, U.N. Head Voices Deep Rage: U.N. Sidelined on Politics but Leads Aid
Effort, GUARDIAN, Apr. 1, 1999, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/1999/
apr/01/martinkettle.
206. Id.
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bomb-ingredient reactors are conducted before the creation of a
bomb and certainly before its imminent use due to military reasons
and intelligence limitations. But once a country has a nuclear weapon
and the means to deliver it, a military air strike may be too late to
prevent the bomb from being used. The definition of a humanitarian
crisis would certainly include the detonation of a nuclear weapon,
however, so this concern is more appropriately one of preemptive
action.
3. Preemptive actions
The legality of preemptive strikes is unsettled; while it is
essentially agreed that there is—and must be—room for a country to
strike preemptively,207 the terms and conditions of when a
preemptive strike is lawful are not universally accepted.208 Article 2 of
the U.N. Charter requires that nations “refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity . . . of any state.”209 The use of force can only be authorized
by a vote of the Security Council.210 Thus, at one end of the
spectrum it may be argued that preemptive attacks without the
sanction of the Security Council are manifestly violations of
international law.
On the other end of the spectrum, the foundational argument
for preemptive attacks is the nation that must attack preemptively in
self-defense. The U.N. Charter affirms that states have an “inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs.”211 On its face, this language limits self-defense to reaction
against armed attacks. What exactly constitutes an armed attack is
debatable, however. Armies massed at a nation’s border, naval
blockades, and attacks against allies would seem to satisfy the
requirement.212 In the modern world, however, with dangers from

207. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 147, at 223 (“Certainly preemption is widely, if not
universally, regarded as a proper action for a nation operating under the rule of law . . . .”).
208. JANE E. STROMSETH, DAVID WIPPMAN & ROSA BROOKS, CAN MIGHT MAKE
RIGHTS?: BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 43 (2006) (stating
that the Bush Doctrine’s version of preemption is a “lightning rod for controversy” and “has
the potential to be destabilizing” to the international community).
209. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
210. Id. at art. 39.
211. Id. at art. 51.
212. See Stratchan, supra note 144, at 27–30 (explaining the strategic considerations the
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cyber attacks and weapons of mass destruction, firm lines regarding
self-defense in this area are problematic. Armed with a nuclear
weapon first strike, waiting for “your turn” at self-defense may not
ensure national survival if “your turn” never comes. Professor
Dershowitz has posited that “when a threat is catastrophic and
relatively certain, though non-imminent, and when the window of
opportunity for effective prevention is quickly closing,” that
preemption would be appropriate and lawful.213 But there is no
agreed upon standard; nations and authorities continue to disagree
in both political circles and the academy.
For example, history’s proof that Israel was correct about Iraq’s
nuclear weapons intentions has not ended the debate of the Osirak
attack’s validity under international law. Israel argued that it acted in
self-defense, as provided for in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. From
Israel’s perspective, it was unwillingly in a permanent state of war
with Iraq,214 and Operation Opera was part of that conflict.
Additionally, Israel argued that the raid was law enforcing, and that
“[i]n the absence of a centralized enforcement body, international
law relies on the willingness of individual states to act on the behalf
of the entire global community.”215 This is the argument for
unilateral action as well as preemption.
In the immediate aftermath of the attack, the international
community—including the United States—felt that Israel acted in
violation of international law. The U.N. Security Council adopted
Resolution 487 less than two weeks after the attack. In the
Resolution, the Security Council referenced the U.N. Charter’s
article 2 requirement that nations refrain from the use of force and
then “strongly condemn[ed] the military attack by Israel in clear
violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of
international conduct.”216 The General Assembly, in a 1986
Resolution, called on Israel to honor Resolution 487’s requirement
for reparations to Iraq and Israel’s allowing IAEA inspectors, and
then put further discussion on its annual agenda until 2005, when it

classical powers of Europe considered as justifying preemption).
213. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 147, at 223.
214. Louis Rene Beres & Col. Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, Reconsidering Israel’s Destruction
of Iraq’s Osiraq Nuclear Reactor, 9 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 437, 439 (1995).
215. Id.
216. Security Council Resolution 487, intro., ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (June 19,
1981).
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dropped the matter.
Just as the General Assembly has moved on, so too some
academics and governments now accept that preemptive strikes and
the use of force without Security Council approval are allowable
under international law.217 There is a practical component for
acceptance as well. Narcissistic dictators with nuclear weapons rightly
inspire fear. As Professor Beres characterized, “Israel’s citizens,
together with Jews and Arabs, American, and other coalition soldiers
who fought in the [1991] Gulf War may owe their lives to Israel’s
courage, skill, and foresight in June 1981.”218 The U.S. currently
ascribes to this doctrine, although this may change under succeeding
Presidents. Although academics have suggested clarifying rules for
when a preemptive strike may properly take place, the debate
continues.219
VI. CONCLUSION
Those who believe that the NPT and other formal mechanisms
of non-proliferation are failing are mistaken—while formal
mechanisms do not address the entire nuclear weapons problem,
they serve as an eighty percent solution to nuclear non-proliferation.
The ad hoc mechanisms of extra-NPT negotiations and unilateral
preemptive strikes address the remaining twenty percent of the
problem. These methods are more than just pragmatic, they are
justifiable under international law. The logic of Justice Jackson of the
U.S. Supreme Court, writing in a free speech case, applies with equal
force to the nuclear nonproliferation debate: “The choice is not
between order and liberty. It is between liberty with order and
anarchy without either. There is danger that, if the Court does not
temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will

217. Anthony D’Amato, Israel’s Air Strike Against the Osiraq Reactor: A Retrospective,
10 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 261 (1996).
218. Beres & Tsiddon-Chatto, supra note 214, at 439.
219. See, e.g., DERSHOWITZ, supra note 147, at 223 (suggesting that “when a threat is
catastrophic and relatively certain, though nonimminent, and when the window of opportunity
for effective prevention is quickly closing,” preemption would be appropriate and lawful);
Abraham D. Sofaer, On the Necessity of Pre-emption, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 220 (2003)
(suggesting that the rule would require examination of 1) the nature and magnitude of the
threat involved; 2) the likelihood that the threat will be realized unless preemptive action is
taken; 3) the availability and exhaustion of alternatives to using force; and 4) whether using
preemptive force is consistent with the terms and purposes of the U.N. Charter and other
applicable international agreements).
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convert the [law] into a suicide pact.”220 This truth must apply any
time that doctrinaire logic confronts reality, to include interpreting
international law. Ad hoc actions, while somewhat destabilizing to
the U.N. and the NPT, are part of “liberty with order”—they will
not destroy the U.N. or the NPT, but they provide the
unpredictable and necessary avenues to deal with the most politically
difficult nuclear proliferation scenarios. Formal mechanisms are
good, but they have weaknesses and often lead to inaction. The
current system of formal mechanisms supplemented by ad hoc actions
is a more complete solution. Even in those areas of the world with
multilateral treaties establishing non-nuclear zones, security
agreements with nuclear powers ensure a greater degree of safety.
Leaders of nations are right to pursue a nuclear strategy that is in the
best interest of their nation. Improving the current system will
require aligning those national interests with international
mechanisms. Some nations simply perceive nuclear weapons as too
dangerous to chance the fate of horrors that could otherwise occur.
Matthew Lund

220. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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